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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE FACEBOOK GENERATION GROWS UP AND KEEP
IT REAL (UGLY) ON SOCIAL MEDIA
THE INTERSECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND FAMILY LAW: THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY IN CURBING LITIGANTS’ USE OF SOCIAL
FRANCES TAPIA MATEO
May 7, 2013

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 23, 2011, Mark Byron took to his Facebook page to vent about his
frustrations with his ongoing divorce and child visitation court battle.1 In his post, Byron
included the following, “…if you are an evil, vindictive woman who wants to ruin your
husband’s life and take your son’s father away from him completely – all you need to do is say
that you’re scared of your husband or domestic partner…”2 Byron’s wife, although blocked
from his Facebook page, eventually learned about the post and brought it to the court’s
attention.3 Byron’s wife used the post as evidence that Byron had violated an existing protective
order that prevented Byron from doing anything to cause his wife “to suffer physical and/or
mental abuse, harassment, annoyance or bodily injury.”

4

The presiding Magistrate found Byron

in contempt of the protective order and gave Byron a choice between posting an apology on his
Facebook page for thirty (30) consecutive days or going to jail for sixty (60) days, Byron chose
the former.5 Byron’s case is an example of how family law judges are reacting to the increased
use of social media related evidence by litigants.
1

Unfortunately, family law courts have

Byron v. Byron, No. DR1101368 (C.P. Jan. 26, 2012) available at
http://news.cincinnati.com/assets/AB185467221.PDF; KIMBALL PERRY, CINCINNATI.COM JUDGE: JAIL
OR FACEBOOK APOLOGY, (2012), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20120222/NEWS/302220184.
2
PERRY, supra note 1 at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.

struggled to find a way to properly address issues related to the increased use of social media.
This is evident by the ever more inconsistent basis with which judges are handling social mediarelated evidence.
Our First Amendment right is a feature that distinguishes us from other free nations
where freedom of speech and expression has been curtailed in one way or another in effort to
protect certain groups.6 However, our First Amendment protections are not without limitations.7
With the growing popularity of social media websites like Facebook, and blogging platforms like
Tumblr and Twitter, the issue of how to balance free speech/expression rights with the court’s
interest in maintaining privacy and legal order has arisen. This issue has not yet been addressed
by the United States Supreme Court.
This paper explores the issue of whether family law judges are vested with the authority
and discretion to curtail or prohibit a litigants’ freedom of speech and expression via social
media in efforts to protect children, privacy8 and maintain legal order. Part II of this paper
discusses the emergence of social media services and their increased popularity as outlets for
communication and expression. This part will also include some examples of how judges are
using social media in their practice. Part III will highlight several family law cases that have
addressed litigants’ use of social media while under the jurisdiction of the court. These cases
show the implication that judge-made rules on social media have litigants’ First Amendment

6

Jonathan Turly, Op-Ed., Shut up and play nice: How the Western world is limiting free speech,
WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, at 1, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1012/opinions/35499274_1_free-speech-defeat-jihad-muslim-man (For example, Denmark, France, Britain,
Greece, Italy, Ireland and Russia have restrictions on anti-religious expression. Also, countries like
Canada and France ban hateful and discriminatory speech.
7
Timothy L. Allsup, United States v. Cassidy: The Federal Interstate Stalking Statute And
Freedom Of Speech, 13 N.C. J.L & Tech. On. 227, 238 (2012).
8
Although it is acknowledge that privacy is an important issue implicated by the increased use of
Social Media, this paper will not address the Fourth Amendment right to privacy or any other subsidiary
issues.
2

rights. Part IV will look at how courts have addressed the intersection of social media and First
Amendment rights within the context of education, employment and criminal law. Lastly, in
Part V this paper will propose a test for family law judges to use in balancing litigants’ freedom
of speech and expression via social media with the court’s interest in protecting maintaining
legal order.
II. THE SOCIAL MEDIA PHENOMENON AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LAW
Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communication through which users
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as
videos).”9 Through social media platforms, users are able to create an internet identity,
update/change content, freely express opinion, interact with other users in the community, and
exchange information in a way unparalleled to any other form of communication.10 In order to
truly understand the impact that social media has had on our society, it is important to understand
how fast-paced the progression and growth of social networking has been over the last eleven
(11) years.11
The social media revolution is said to have started with the birth of Friendster in 2002.12
Friendster is considered the "grandaddy" of social networks.13 The service allowed users to
contact other members, maintain those contacts, and share online content and media with those

9

M-W.COM, SOCIAL MEDIA, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last
visited May 5, 2013).
10
Hannah Rogers Metcalfe, Libel in the Blogosphere and Social Media: Thoughts on Reaching
Adolescence, 5 Charleston L. Rev. 481, 492 (2010-2011).
11
STEVEN J. VENEZIA, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR JOURNAL, THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL
MEDIA AND THE LAW AND HOW TO SURVIVE THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION, 24 (2012),
http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/BJ-Winter2012-Vol52-No4-Pg24.pdf;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friendster.
12
Id.
13
Ling Woo Liu, Friendster Moves to Asia, TIME, Jan. 29, 2008, at 1 available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1707760,00.html; Wikipedia, Friendster,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friendster (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
3

contacts.14 The website was also used for dating and discovering new events, bands, and
hobbies.15 It is said that this website pioneered the connection of “friends.”16 Friendster’s user
base grew to over 3 million in the first three months.17
Following the growth of Friendster, in August 2003, several eUniverse employees with
Friendster accounts decided to create a new social networking site that mimicked the more
popular features of the website but added a music and gamming component to create MySpace.18
MySpace’s popularity was short-lived, and in 2004, the social networking giant Facebook was
launched.19 The website's membership was initially limited by the founders to Harvard students,
but was subsequently expanded to other colleges and high school students.20 Today, Facebook
allows any person at least 13 years old to become a registered user of the site.21 As of September
2012, Facebook had over one billion active users, more than half of whom access Facebook on
their personal mobile device.22
In 2005, YouTube arrived on the social media scene promoting itself as a “video-sharing”
website. Like its other social media predecessors YouTube also allows its members to create

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
See VENEZIA, supra note 11.
18
Felix Gillette, The Rise and Inglorious Fall of Myspace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jun. 27,
2011, at 1, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/b4235053917570.htm.
19
Id.
20
Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 25, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia.
21
Facebook, Information for Parents and Educators, https://www.facebook.com/help/parents (last
viewed Apr. 2, 2013).
22
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Tops Billion-User Mark, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 4,
2012, at 1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443635404578036164027386112.html.
15
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unique profiles. However, YouTube is most known for its video sharing capabilities. YouTube is
recognized as the third most popular website in the world.23
Newer additions to the social media phenomenon include microblogging platforms, most
notably Twitter and Tumblr.
networking/microblogging services.

Twitter and Tumblr are considered hybrid social
Twitter enables its users to send and read text-based

messages of up to 140 characters, known as "tweets".24 As of 2012, Twitter had over 500
million registered users. Alternatively, Tumbler, allows users to post multimedia and other
content to a short-form blog. Users can follow other users' blogs, as well as make their blogs
private.25 As of October 13, 2012, Tumblr had over 77 million blogs.26 Tumblr scored 13.4
million unique visitors in the United States alone in July 2011—up 218% from July 2010.27
The social media revolution has transcended generations; people from all walks of life
have taken to the web and adapted to this alternative forum of communication. In 2011, it was
estimated that approximately eighty percent (80%) of adults in the United States who had
computers used social media and most reported spending a majority of their computer time on
social media websites, like Facebook.28 Recent statistics show that “the average Facebook user
creates ninety pieces of content each month, and there are more than 30 billion pieces of content,

23

Reuters, YouTube Serves Up 100 Million Videos a Day Online, USA TODAY, Jul. 16, 2006, at
1, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-youtube-views_x.htm.
24
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter.
25
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tumblr.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Dolly Hernandez, ABA Webinar, The Impact of Social Media on a Divorce Case: Big Brother
is Watching (2011).
5

including blog posts, photos, and news stores shared each month.”29 It is reported that Twitter
generates over 340 million tweets a day and handles over 1.6 billion search queries per day. 30
Society has taken to social media as our new favorite medium of communicating with the
outside world. These online platforms provide the instant gratification of being able to speak
your mind with the ease of a few key strokes and a click. However, there are drawbacks to this
form of communication. A user of social media runs the risk of having his or her online activities
used against him or her in court. Consequently, this increased use of social media has had an
impact on many areas of the law.31 For example, Facebook status updates and photos can reveal
anything from a person’s location, physical condition, stated of mind, and even aid in identifying
potential witnesses.32 And, although social media-related evidence is subject to formal discovery
requirements33; the ease of access of this type of evidence has made it a favorite among attorneys
and pro se litigants in divorce and child custody proceedings.34 Unfortunately, our courts have
struggled to find a way to properly address issues related to society’s increased use of social
media.
In her 2009 article, Social Networks Help Judges Do Their Duty, Miriam Rozen provides
examples of how judges are using litigants’ social media posts in their practice.35 Among the
judges highlighted is Judge Kathryn Lanan, who presides over the detention and adjudication
29

Jeff Bullas, 50 Fascinating Facebook Facts And Figures,
http://www.jeffbullas.com/2011/04/28/50-fascinating-facebook-facts-and-figures/ (last visited Apr 2,
2013).
30
Id.
31
See VENEZIA, supra note 11.
32
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May Transform
Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 81 (2012).
33
See VENEZIA, supra note 11.
34
See Burk Robertson supra note 32 (“…Facebook and other social-media sites may offer
substantial evidence gathering capabilities to individual litigants, both through formal and information
discovery mechanisms.”).
35
Miriam Rozen, Social Networks Help Judges Do Their Duty, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Aug.
25, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202433293771.
6

hearings at the Gavelston Juvenile Justice Center in Texas.

Judge Lanan has taken an

unconventional way of tracking the juveniles under her court’s jurisdiction,36 she requires that
the juveniles “friend” her on their respective Facebook or MySpace pages so that she can keep
track of all the content on their pages (pictures, posts, likes, etc.).37 According to Rozem’s
article, over the past two years, Judge Lanan has tied her juvenile offenders’ social networking to
the terms of their probation by limiting the types of Social Media posts they are allowed to make
to those she classifies as “age appropriate”.38 Judge Lanan shared that some defense lawyers
have objected to her monitoring the juvenile’s social media pages as a violation of their client’s
First Amendment rights. Judge Lanan defends her unconventional monitoring by stating that it is
her way of guarding her probationer’s privacy.39
A second example provided by Rozen is that of family law Judge Orlinda Naranjo of
Travis County, Texas. Judge Naranjo states that she has seen first-hand the impact that social
media has had over the family law cases she presides.40 According to Judge Naranjo, the number
of attorneys introducing social media-related evidence has increased in recent years.41 Naranjo
acknowledged that when litigants produce this type of evidence, she does look at the content of
the social media posts when making a determination, especially in child-custody related
matters.42

36

Id at 3.
Id.
38
Id. (“If a juvenile probationer posts content that involves sex, drugs or gangs, for example, she
requires them to return to her court for a compliance hearing. She tells the juvenile that they must remove
the offensive material or stay in detention until it is removed…”).
39
See Rozen supra note 35 (“Lanan believes that monitoring the sites reduced the chances that
the juveniles will post comments or photos they will regret as adults.).
40
Id. at 4.
41
Id. (“In 2006, Texas became one of the first states in the nation to adopt rules governing the
admission of evidence in civil proceedings obtained from social networking sites and individual
pages…”).
42
Id.
37

7

III. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON FAMILY LAW PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGANTS’ FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The protections afforded by the First Amendment give us the right to post on social
media, but the law has been unhurried to afford protections once those posts have been made.
The reality is that even today, most users of social media never contemplate having their online
activities used against them in a court of law and yet it is happening ever more. In the family
law context, social media-related evidence has become commonplace however judges have been
provided little guidance on how to appropriately respond to this type of evidence. The cases that
follow demonstrate the impact that social media has had in family law proceedings by focusing
on how judges respond to litigants’ social media activities and the implications on the litigants’
First Amendment rights.
a. Social Media Evidence in Family Law
The 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Federal
Rules”) made it possible for litigants to request production of electronically stored information
(“ESI”) that can include any content stored in social media.43 Currently, 42 states have adopted
e-Discovery rules similar to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules.44 The impact of social
media has been particularly great in divorce cases where social media related evidence has
become the standard.45 According to a 2010 survey by the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, “an overwhelming 81% of the nation’s top divorce attorneys say they have seen an

43

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 26(a)(1), 33, and 34; See VENEZIA, supra note 11 at 25.
K&L Gates, Current Listing of States that Have Enacted E-Discovery Rules,
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/promo/state-district-court-rules/ (last visited May 4, 2013).
44

45

See VENEZIA, supra note 11 at 27; (The results of an American Bar Association poll showed
that Facebook was the website most cited for those introducing social media-related evidence in family
law proceedings.)
8

increase in the number of cases using social networking evidence during the past five years…” it
is probably safe assume the that number has gone up since then.

46

Moreover, with sixty-six

present (66%) of attorneys citing it as the primary source for social media-related evidence,
Facebook has become a ‘go to’ source in divorce proceedings.47
Examples abound of ways in which attorneys are effectively using social media-related
evidence to obtain favorable outcomes in their family law cases. For example, in a recent
custody dispute a father was able to use Facebook evidence to show the negative impact that his
wife’s online gaming habits had on his children.48 Specifically, the father was able to use
evidence from Facebook to show that the mother was playing Farmville during days and time
when their children were recorded as being late for school. The father was granted physical
custody of the children.49
As states continue adopt and reformat e-discovery rules to meet litigants’ needs, other
subsidiary issues arise. For example, in Gallion v. Gallion, Connecticut Judge Kenneth Shluger
ordered divorcing couple, Stephan and Courtney Gallion to swap their Facebook and dating
website login names and passwords so that their respective attorneys can search for evidence of
cheating.50 Judge Shluger’s order carries huge implications for the Gallions and other couples
similarly situated. First, Judge Shluger’s order is in direct violation of Facebook’s “Terms of

46

American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Nation's Top Divorce Lawyers Note Dramatic
Rise In Electronic Evidence, http://www.aaml.org/about-the-academy/press/press-releases/ediscovery/nations-top-divorce-lawyers-note-dramatic-rise-el (last visited on May 4, 2013).
47
Id.
48
Michael Bowman, Social Media Wins — and Loses — Family Law Cases,
JDSUPRALAWNEWS, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/social-media-wins-and-losesfamily-l-48947/.
49
Id.
50
Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2517 at *1(Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 30, 2011); Kashmir Hill, Judge Orders Divorcing Couple to Swap Facebook and Dating Site
Passwords, FORBES, Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/11/07/judge-ordersdivorcing-couple-to-swap-facebook-and-dating-site-passwords/.
9

Service”, which prohibits the sharing of passwords.51 Next, the order represents an invasion of
privacy by granting opposing counsel unfettered access to the litigants’ cyber identity that goes
beyond allowing discovery of ESI. Most importantly, the order implicates litigant’s First
Amendment rights. Specifically, the order has a chilling effect on the litigants’ freedom of
expression, by inadvertently signaling to them that their online speech will be more highly
scrutinized and ultimately afforded less protection. Judge’s Shluger’s order seems to go beyond
the scope of e-discovery into dangerous and unchartered waters.

b. Content-Based Restrictions on Litigants’ Social Media Posts
The Supreme Court has declared numerous times that the United States Constitution does
not prohibit nor condemn otherwise protected speech just because it may be offensive in
nature.52 On the contrary, the Court has stated that “the burden normally falls upon the viewer to
"avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." 53 Thus, any
content-based restriction on speech is presumed invalid unless, it can satisfy the requirements of
a strict scrutiny standard.54 In order to overcome strict scrutiny, the governmental action, law, or
regulation must “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest”, and
“there must not be a less restrictive alternative” that would serve said purpose.55 The Court has
carved out a few narrowly-defined categories of speech that fall outside First Amendment

51

Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
(last visited on Apr. 2, 2013).
52
See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).
53
Erznoznik 422 U.S. at 210-211; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
54
See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.”)
55
Id.
10

protection, which includes: true threats,56 obscenity,57 defamation,58 fraud,59 incitement,60 and
speech integral to criminal conduct.61

The Court’s commitment to limiting the categories of

speech that fall outside First Amendment’s protection is reflective of the value Americans place
on their freedom of speech and how much they are willing to tolerate in its defense.62
In Morelli v. Morelli case, Anthony Morelli created a blog, “ThePsychoExWife” to vent
about his bitter divorce and custody battle against his wife, Allison Morelli.63 However,
Pennsylvania Judge Diane E. Gibbons ordered Morelli to take down the site and forbade him
from making any further comments about his ex-wife on any form of public media.64 Judge
Gibbons has stated that her decision was based on a balancing of Morelli’s First Amendment
rights against his children’s best interest.65 This case exemplifies a conflict between the family
judges’ use of the best interest of the child standard and a content-based restriction on Morelli’s
speech.
Based on the facts provided, it is doubtful that Judge Gibbons’ restriction on Morelli’s
speech would satisfy the strict scrutiny standard for a content-based restriction on speech.
Family law judges, like Judge Gibbons, have used the wide range of discretion that the best
interest of the child standard grants them to impose restrictions on the Parent’s First Amendment

56

See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 485 (1957).
58
See Beauharnais v. Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 261 (1952).
59
See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
60
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
61
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); Allsup, supra note 7 at
57

239.
62

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Morelli v. Morelli, No. A06-04-60750-C, (C.P. Aug. 30, 2011) available at
http://www.savethepsychoexwife.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/083011-Gibbons-OpinionAppeal.pdf.
64
Lylah M. Alphonse, Bashing Your Ex In Public May Be Free Speech, But Is It In Your
Children’s Best Interest?, YAHOO, Aug. 9, 2011, http://shine.yahoo.com/love-sex/bashing-your-ex-inpublic-may-be-free-speech-but-is-it-in-your-childrens-best-interests-2523754.htmlId.
65
Id.
63
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rights.66

The best interest of the child standard (“the standard”) is used in child custody and

visitation hearings.67 Although there are some state to state variations of the elements that
comprise the standard, generally it allows family law judges to consider a parent’s ideology
when making their determination.68 First Amendment scholar, Eugene Volokh, has argued that
“the best interest test lets courts engage in a wide range of [otherwise unconstitutional]
viewpoint-based speech restrictions.”69 Furthermore, Volokh argues that the First Amendment is
implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents’ speech, but also when courts
make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech.”70 Unlike the strict scrutiny standard
that is applied to other content-based restrictions on speech, appellate review of child custody or
visitation orders that contain restrictions on parents’ speech apply an abuse of discretion
standard, and are rarely set aside.71
c. Compelled Speech as a Form of Redress
Under our First Amendment doctrine, speech compulsions and restrictions on speech are
afforded the same level of protection.72 Any government regulation aimed at compelling speech
is deemed “an infringement on a person’s right not to speak and not to associate, rights the First
Amendment ensures.”73 The Byron v. Byron case (referenced in Part I. “Introduction” of this
paper); received wide media attention when an Ohio Magistrate presiding over Domestic

66

See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 631 (2006).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 638 (citing Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 254 (2004), reversed a lower court
decision that ordered parent to conceal homosexual preference from their child).
70
Volokh supra note 66 at 631.
71
See Volokh supra note 66 at 647.
72
See Volokh supra note 66 at 652 (“compelled affirmations, especially affirmations of opinion,
are indeed treated the same as speech restrictions.”).
73
Laurel S. Banks, Schutz v. Schutz, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 105, 117 (1992-1993).
12

Relations Court issued an order that both restricted and compelled a litigant’s speech over social
media.74
On December 2, 2011 Elizabeth Byron (“Elizabeth”) filed Motion for Contempt against
her then estranged husband Mark Byron (“Mark”).75 Elizabeth contended that Mark violated a
prior Civil Order of Protection that prohibited Mark from having any “direct or indirect” contact
with Elizabeth when he posted the following comments on his Facebook wall:76
Reunited [with son] after four months apart
If you are an evil, vindictive woman who wants to ruin your
husband’s life and take your son’s father away from him
completely, all you need to do is say that you’re scared of your
husband or domestic partner and they’ll take him away.
She filed false DV against me along with a false Civil Protection
Order77
After reviewing the contents of the Facebook posts, Ohio Magistrate, Paul W. Myers,
found Mark in contempt of the Civil Protection Order.78 Specifically, the Magistrate’s found that
Mark violated the Civil Protection Order by:
[p]osting only his self-serving belief that the domestic violence
charge was false and failing to include anything regarding the
judicial process which led to the issuance of the civil protection
order [although] clearly not illegal … was just as clearly intended
to mentally abuse, harass, and annoy [Elizabeth] and to generate a
negative and venomous response toward her from his Facebook
friends…79

74

See Byron supra note 1.
Id.
76
Id.
77
See Byron supra note 1.
78
Id.
79
Id.; (Some of the comments generated by Mark’s Facebook venting against his wife and legal
proceedings include: “Fuck that bitch”, “She must be Funky Rotten” and “What an evil bitch!”).
75
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Mark was subsequently sentenced to sixty (60) days in jail and a fine.

80

Or, in the alterative,

Mark was given the option of purging himself of the contempt and avoiding both the sixty (60)
day jail sentence and fine by posting on his Facebook wall (“every day no later than 9:00 A.M.
for a period of 30 days commencing February 1, 2013”) an apology to Elizabeth that was
authored by the Magistrate himself. The apology included the following statements:
I would like to apologize to my wife, Elizabeth Byron, for the
comments regarding her and our son … which were posted on my
Facebook wall on or about November 23, 2011. I hereby
acknowledge that two judicial officials … have heard evidence and
determined that I committed an act of domestic violence against
Elizabeth on January 17, 2011. I hereby apologize to Elizabeth for
casting her in an unfavorable light by suggesting that she withheld
[our son] from me or that she in any way prevented me from
seeing [our son] during that period. That decision was mine and
mine alone. I further apologize to all my Facebook Friends for
attempting to mislead them … which caused several of my
Facebook Friends to respond with angry, venomous, and
inflammatory comments of their own. …81
Mark chose to post the apology over serving the sixty day jail sentence and paying a fine.82
Aside from having to post the Facebook apology for thirty (30) consecutive days, Mark was also
forbidden from eliminating or in any manner reducing the number of his Facebook Friends who
had access to his Facebook comments.83 Mark was further instructed to designate Elizabeth or
another individual designated by her as his Facebook Friend to monitor compliance with the
order.84
The Byron case is interesting because it implicated Mark’s First Amendment rights by (1)
effectuating a content-based restriction on his social media speech and (2) compelling Mark to
post an apology drafted by a court magistrate that clearly cut against his personally held beliefs
80

Id.
See Byron supra note 1.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
81
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on the matter. By finding Mark in contempt of the Civil Protection Order the court placed a
content-based restriction on Mark’s speech. The magistrate found Mark in contempt although he
arguably took precautions (Elizabeth was blocked from his Facebook wall and his comments
never addressed her by name) to avoid his wife finding out about his Facebook comments.85
And yet, the Magistrate held that Mark’s comments were “clearly intended to be mentally
abusive, harassing and annoying to his wife.”86

The Magistrate’s findings raise important

questions about the scope of Civil Protection Orders and their effect on a litigant’s freedom of
expression, especially in a case like Byron, where the speech did not directly reference nor
specifically address the person the Civil Order of Protection sought to protect.
Second, the choice the Magistrate gave Mark between serving time in jail for sixty (60)
days and posting the Facebook for thirty (30) days clearly fell within the parameters of
compelled speech which the Supreme Court deemed in 1943. 87 In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the court addressed the issue compulsory speech in the context of a
statewide regulation that required public school children to salute the United States flag while
reciting the pledge of allegiance.88 Ultimately, the Court declared the statewide regulation
unconstitutional, by eloquently stating that compelled speech, like a flag saluting mandate,
“transcends constitutional limitations on [the state’s] power… … no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox… or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act...”89 Mark Byron was never really presented with a choice of punishments, the order
compelled him to publish an apology authored by the Magistrate that clearly contradicted his
personal opinions on the matter.
85

Id..
Id.
87
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
88
Id. at 626.
89
Id. at 642.
86
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The cases above show the great level of discretion and deference afforded to the judges
that preside over family law cases. However, these cases also highlight some of the dangers
associated with giving judges unfettered discretion in dealing with social media-related evidence
and impact these decisions have on litigants’ freedom of speech and expression. Litigants’ First
Amendment rights should not have to be sacrificed in the absence of an acceptable a framework
within which to analyze social media-related evidence.

IV. THE INTERSECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
AREAS OF THE LAW

AND

SOCIAL MEDIA

IN

OTHER

A review of how other areas of the law have addressed the intersection of social media
and First Amendment rights is presented below. The areas of education, employment and
criminal law are analyzed in an attempt to identify the usage or standardization of a basic
framework for balancing First Amendment rights within the context of social media.
a. Education law Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights
In recent years, we have become ever more aware of the negative impact that bullying
has on students. The issue has been exacerbated by the fact that bullying has transcended the
schoolyard and evolved with the increased use of the internet and growth in popularity of social
media as a communication platform. Currently, a more sophisticated, and in some ways more
damaging, form of bullying is occurring via the World Wide Web known as cyberbulling.90
Cyberbulling has been defined as “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of
computers, cell phone and other devices…”91 Since most incidents of cyberbulling take place off
campus, school administrators and courts have grappled with how to properly deal with this new
90

See Nicole P. Grant, Mean Girls and Boys: The intersection of Cyberbulling and Privacy Law
and Its Social-Political Implications, 56 How. L. J. 169, 172 (2012).
91
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Bulling Beyond the Schoolyard: Preventing and
Responding to Cyberbulling 5 (2009).
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form of bullying and its damaging effects on students.92 At the heart of the problem is the fact
that, attempts by school administrators to regulate cyberbulling implicates students’ First
Amendment rights. Today, schools continue to rely on a few seminal Supreme Court’s decisions
that have attempted to balance students’ First Amendment rights with the schools duty to
maintain order and protect students from harm.93
i. Tinker and its Successors
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the Supreme Court’s
first attempt at addressing the issue of students’ on campus speech.94 Decided in 1969, Tinker set
a standard for regulating student speech that is still relied upon by courts and school officials
today.95 The Tinker standard provides that “…conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason … materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.”96 While the Tinker standard empowers school officials to regulate certain types of
student speech, it clearly stated that the school must be able to show that “its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”97
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See Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of School Discipline
of Student Cyberspeech, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 727, 730 (2007).
93
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See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (The Tinker case
involved a group of students who wore black armbands to school in protest against the Vietnam War.
The students wore the armbands despite the fact that a few days prior, the school had adopted a policy
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refused. Therefore, the students were sent home and suspended until they were willing to comply with the
school’s no-armband policy. The student’s parents brought an action on their behalf alleging a violation
of their children’s First Amendment rights.).
95
See Grant supra note 90.
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In his now famous opinion, Justice Fortas stated that neither “students [n]or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”98 The
Court found that Tinker had engaged in a form of symbolic speech protected by the First
Amendment.99 The Court noted that the school was not able show that the students’ actions
substantially interfered with the school’s appropriate level of discipline and its ability to maintain
safety.100 Ultimately, the Court found that the school was in violation of the students’ First
Amendment rights to free speech and expression.101
Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue of student speech on three
separate occasions. First, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser.102 In Fraser the Court distinguished between the protections that the First Amendment
grants adults in making “use of an offensive form of expression” and that of public school
children.103 The Court found it a “highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”104 The Court held that the
First Amendment did not prevent the school administrators from disciplining students for the use
of “offensively lewd and indecent speech” in a school event.105
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Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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Next, in 1988, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.106 In
Kuhlmeier, the Court noted that “public schools do not possess all of the attributes of … public
forums …” and therefore, “…school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech
of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.”107 Moreover, the Court held
that public schools can “exercise editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns”.108
Lastly, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v. Frederick.109

In Morse, the

Supreme Court held that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”
110

The Court noted that it did not base its decision on the fact that the student speech in this was

either disruptive (Tinker)111 or offensive (Fraser)112 but rather focused on the illegal nature of the
activity the speech promoted and the existing problem of drug among school-aged children.113
1. Applying Tinker to Student Off-Campus Internet Speech
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See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260(1988) (In Hazelwood, student staff
members of a school sponsored newspaper brought an action against their school after their principal
decided to pull two articles from publication. The principal pulled the articles from publication because
he felt that some of the topics covered by the articles were not appropriate, especially for some of the
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illegal drug use.).
110
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The Supreme Court’s decisions addressing student speech have been limited to oncampus or school sponsored events and activities.114

However, in recent years lower courts

have dealt with the issue of whether schools should regulate student speech that causes
disruption within the school but occurs off-campus (as part of a non-school sponsored event or
activity) or on the internet.115 District Courts have uniformly applied the Tinker standard to
examine off-campus internet student speech,116 however courts are divided on the issue of
whether a school must establish a “sufficient nexus”117 between the off-campus internet speech
before the Tinker standard is applied.118 A majority of courts have not required schools to
establish this sufficient nexus standard.119 However, in some courts have imposed a two part test
for examining student off-campus internet speech. In these jurisdictions, a school must first
show a substantial nexus between the student speech and the school.120 Next, these courts use the
Tinker standard to examine the extent that the student speech “materially and substantially
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interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”121 In
examining this second prong, courts consider the “intensity of on campus discussions
surrounding the expression, the burden the expression places on the administration, and whether
the expression contains violent content.”122
Most recently, the Tinker standard was applied to a cyberbulling case in Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Sch.123 In this case, Kowalski, a high school senior used her home computer to
create a fake MySpace profile in which she ridiculed a fellow classmate. 124 After creating the
fake profile, Kowalski invited one hundred (100) classmates to “friend” the page and join in the
ridicule of the student.125 The targeted student and her parents became aware of the page and
reported it to school administrators.126 Kowalski was subsequently suspended from school.127
Kowalski brought an action against the school.128 Among her many claims, Kowalski alleged
that the school was in violation of her First Amendment rights by punishing her for speech that
occurred outside the school.129 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school, holding that the school acted within its authority when it punished Kowalski. 130 On
Appeal, the court held that the school had not violated Kowalski’s First Amendment rights
because, (1) there was a nexus between her speech and “the school's pedagogical interests … to
Fishwick supra note 114 (The Tinker standard …is concerned with whether the expression has
caused or foreseeably will cause substantial disruption on campus, from the perspective of the school
officials when they decided to punish the student or prevent the conduct.”).
122
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123
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justify the action taken by administrators …,131 (2) the speech was materially and substantially
disruptive in that it interfered with the school's work and collided with the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone,132 and (3) it was foreseeable that her conduct would
reach the school...”133 The Supreme Court has since denied Kowalski a writ of certiorari.134
b. Employment law: the Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights
In the last five years we have seen an increase in litigations resulting from employers
terminating employees because of their internet speech.135 Some attribute the phenomenon to the
fact that the average aged Facebook user has transitioned from the school to the work
environment. 136 Some opine that at the heart of the problem lies in the fact that “[w]hile most
business executives assert they have a right to know about all of their employees’ social
networking activities, most employees believe their bosses have not right to inquire into their
non-work lives.” 137 The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of employees’ First Amendment
rights in the context of retaliation, where an employee suffers adverse employment action for
criticizing her employer.138 However, the Court has not addressed the issue of an Employee’s
First Amendment rights with respect to off-duty, non-work related speech.139 Nonetheless, lower
courts faced with increased wrongful termination lawsuits resulting from an employee’s use of
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social media, have had to make decisions based on statues that did not contemplate the social
media phenomenon when crafted.140
Before addressing First Amendment protections afforded in the employment context, it is
important to note that the law draws a distinction between private and public employees.141
Private employees are afforded less free speech protection than their public sector
counterparts.142 The majority of private sector employees are considered “at will”. Under the
employment-at-will-doctrine and employee can be terminated with or without cause, so long as
the reason for termination does not contravene public policy or protected under a limited
category of protected speech.143 Therefore, a private sector employer is within his rights to
terminate an employee for social media posts the employer finds objectionable, even if it is
completely non-work related.
Contrastingly, public sector employees have enjoyed more robust free speech protections
in the workplace than private sector employees; public employers are subject to the restraints of
the First Amendment.144 In 2006 the Supreme Court set out the current test for disputes arising
out of adverse employment action resulting from an employee’s speech or expression related to
work.145 In Garcetti, the Court set out a three-part test to determine whether an employee’s
speech should be afforded First Amendment protection and insulated from adverse action. First,
the court must decide whether the employee was speaking as a private citizen rather than within
140
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his official capacity as a public employee.146 Next, the court must determine whether the speech
was a matter of public concern.147 Lastly, if the court determines that the speech was a matter of
public concern, then the court must determine whether the employer’s interest in maintaining an
effective workplace outweighs the employee’s free speech rights.148
In 2010, the National Relations Board (“NLRB”) announced that the National Relations
Act’s (“NLRA”) coverage expanded to protect employees’ social media speech.149 The NLRA’s
coverage is expended to most private employees.150 However, it is important to note that in the
2010 expansion of the NLRA coverage,

social media-related speech is limited to protect

employee concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.

151

Therefore, an

employee who resorts to his Facebook wall to vent about his how much he dislikes his supervisor
or co-workers is likely not afforded the protection of the NLRA. 152
c. Criminal law: Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights
There are currently two federal statutes in place to combat what has been classified as
“cyberstalking” or abuse via social media, the Federal Interstate Stalking Statue, 18 U.S.C. §
2261A and the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c).153 The Federal Interstate
Stalking Statue, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A was enacted in 1996 as part of the Violence Against Women
Act (“VAWA”).154 The statute was subsequently amended to cover electronic communications
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that took place across state lines.155 The amendment imposes criminal liability to anyone who
with intent:
travels in interstate … or …
uses the mail, any interactive
computer service, or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce
to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial emotional
distress to that person or places that person in reasonable fear of
the death of, or serious bodily injury to, any of the persons
described ….156
In effect, the statue extends to emails, tweets, blogs and other social media posts where the
stalker can be shown to have the requisite intent and the victim has suffered emotional distress or
fear as a result.157

However, the statute is limited in that it is only applicable when the

cyberstalker and the victim live in different states. Furthermore, the Federal Interstate Stalking
Statute does not protect against incidents of anonymous cyberstalking.158
A second federal statute offering some protection to victims of harassment/cyberstalking
is the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c).159

Under the Interstate

Communications Act:
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 160
Unlike the Interstate Stalking Statute, the Interstate Communications Act attaches to all
forms of online communications, whether anonymous or not. 161

Nonetheless, this statute

requires that the online behavior rise to the level of “threat of injury.”162 Therefore, online
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harassing behavior such as repeated messages containing graphic sexually implicit messages,
posting embarrassing photos over social media, or negative commentary of a person are not
covered by this statute.163 The statute is limited to “true threats,”164 one of the few categories of
speech that fall outside First Amendment Protection.
After a close review of the three areas of the law (education, employment and criminal)
mentioned above it is evident that there is some great variation among the tests applied in
evaluating evidence of social media however, there were two common trends. Specifically, all
three areas considered whether there was a nexus between the social media speech and the
impacted party. And, all three considered the impact the litigants’ social media speech had on the
opposing party and provide a threshold standard the speech must meet before adverse
consequences can apply.

V. TOWARDS A WORKING PARADIGM FOR ASSESSING
RESPONSES TO LITIGANTS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

THE

PROPRIETY

OF

JUDICIAL

Our judicial system has been caught off guard by the social media phenomenon. Courts
have struggled to find a balance between the robust free speech values afforded by the First
Amendment and the need to regulate online speech. The impact of social media has been
especially hard felt by litigants in family law disputes where First Amendment rights have been
sacrificed in the name of judicial discretion.
It is important to acknowledge that family law judges have valid interest in maintaining
order and protecting the rights of all the litigants that come before them. Additionally, because
of the diverse needs of families and individuals in family court is anything but predictable, it is
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important that any proposed framework for analyzing a litigant’s social media speech have some
built-in level of flexibility to allow judges to adapt the ever changing circumstances they are
confronted with. Lastly, an effective framework for analyzing a litigant’s social media speech is
one that attempts to balance First Amendment rights and the court’s interest in maintaining legal
order. A proposed test for family law judges analyzing a litigant’s social media speech would
require the judge to consider the following:
1. A nexus exist between the speech and the judicial proceeding
2. The speech has to be substantially disruptive to the effective resolution of the
contested matter or
o The standard would require a more than a statement of dissent against your
former spouse but less than a threat of physical harm.
3. The speech violates either some aspect of a standing order or undermines the court’s
authority.
o This prong would address violations of standing orders of protection
4. Was the litigant’s speech accessible to the opposing party
o This prong would require the court to look into the litigant’s social media
privacy settings. The fact that the litigant intentionally restricted access to his
social media accounts specifically restricted the opposing party’s ability to
view his speech should be weighed in favor of the litigant. After all, the
Supreme Court has noted that “the burden normally falls upon the viewer to
"avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes."165
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This framework would also limit the litigant’s liability for third party comments generated by his
posts. And lastly, if the litigants’ speech meet the standards above and the court chooses to
enforce a content-based restriction on the litigant, such restriction on speech should be limited to
the completion of the judicial proceeding or standing order in cases where there is an active
restraining order.
Furthermore, there are other options family law judges can explore in lieu of ordering
content based restrictions. Judges can order litigants to discontinue visiting each other’s social
media pages. Judges can also order litigants’ to attend classes that focus on the implication
social media has on an individual’s privacy and detail the risks involved with using social media.
Lastly, social media providers should be held to some level of accountability when they
fail to act in instances where the speech posted on their platforms rises to the level of severe
harassment or threat. Specifically, social media providers should be liable for their failure to
remove posts that within one of the categories of unprotected speech and have been appropriately
flagged or reported for removal.
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